

Judicial Independence After the Amendments

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This report reviews six structural reforms proposed by the Constitutional Reform Commission and evaluates the international evidence supporting each. We examine parliamentary oversight capacity, the appointment and disciplinary processes governing the judiciary, and the guardrails that have held Mongolia's democracy in place since 1992.--We recommend a phased approach anchored in judicial independence and legislative oversight - building analytical capacity first, then structural reform, on the basis that the evidence produced by the former is what makes the latter defensible.--The full analysis, methodology, and data appendix are available in the PDF below. This report reviews six structural reforms proposed by the Constitutional Reform Commission and evaluates the international evidence supporting each. We examine parliamentary oversight capacity, the appointment and disciplinary processes governing the judiciary, and the guardrails that have held Mongolia's democracy in place since 1992.--We recommend a phased approach anchored in judicial independence and legislative oversight - building analytical capacity first, then structural reform, on the basis that the evidence produced by the former is what makes the latter defensible.--The full analysis, methodology, and data appendix are available in the PDF below. This report reviews six structural reforms proposed by the Constitutional Reform Commission and evaluates the international evidence supporting each. We examine parliamentary oversight capacity, the appointment and disciplinary processes governing the judiciary, and the guardrails that have held Mongolia's democracy in place since 1992.--We recommend a phased approach anchored in judicial independence and legislative oversight - building analytical capacity first, then structural reform, on the basis that the evidence produced

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